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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's Memorandum Decision and
Order Regarding Part ll and Part Ill of the lnformation in which the district court
concluded that although one of the defendant's prior judgments of conviction for
driving under the influence was admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, it
was not admissible under I.C. § 9-312 or 28 U.S.C. 5 1738.'
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Jim Howard with driving under the influence ("DUI") and
driving without privileges. (R., pp.38-39, 42-43.) The state also alleged, in an
lnformation Parts II and Ill, respectively, that Howard had two prior convictions
for DUI within ten years and that he is a persistent violator. (R., pp.39, 42-43.)
Howard pled not guilty.
Prior to opening statements, Howard pled guilty to the driving without
privileges charges and proceeded to trial only on the DUI charge. (R, Vol. II,
p.273.) The jury was, however, unable to reach a verdict on whether Howard
was guilty of DUI and the court declared a mistrial. (R., Vol. I, p.144.) At the
conclusion of the retrial, the jury returned a verdict finding Howard guilty of DUI.
(R., Vol. 11, p.234.) Howard agreed to submit to a court trial on the lnformation
Part II and the persistent violator enhancement. (R., Vol. 11, p.273.)

' The state is not challenging the court's conclusion that the judgments offered in
support of the persistent violator enhancement (Part Ill) were not admissible
under the rules of evidence.

At the court trial, the state offered, as evidence, the judgment from
Howard's prior DUI conviction in Kern County California ("California Judgment")
and the judgment from his prior DUI conviction in Kootenai County. (Tr., pp.237262; Exhibits 7 9 and 8.) Howard objected, arguing the California Judgment was
inadmissible because, he claimed, it was not properly authenticated as required
by I.R.E. 902, and did not comply with 28 U.S.C. 3 1738, the Full Faith and Credit
clause of the United States Constitution, or I.C. § 9-312. (Tr., p.237, L.25 p.238, L.23; R., Vol. 11, pp.258-61.) The district court concluded both judgments
were admissible under I.R.E. 803(6),' but ultimately rejected the California
Judgment finding it was not entitled to "full faith and credit" because it did not
comply with I.C.

9-312 or 28 U.S.C. § 1738. (R., Vol. 11, pp.276-82.) Thus, the

court concluded, Howard was not guilty of the DUI enhancement. (R., Vol. 11,
p.282.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.233-35.)

'The court also took judicial notice of the Kootenai County judgment. ( ~ r . p.262,
,
Ls.12-17.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err in excluding evidence of the California Judgment under
I.C. § 9-312 or 28 U.S.C. 3 1738 even though it was admissible under the Idaho
Rules of Evidence?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Concludina The California Judgment, Althouah
Admissible Under The ldaho Rules Of Evidence, Could Not Be Considered For
Enhancement Purposes Because It Did Not Complv With I.C. 5 9-312 Or 28
U.S.C. 5 1738
A.

Introduction
Although the California Judgment offered by the state in support of the

DUI enhancement was admissible under the ldaho Rules of Evidence, the district
court refused to consider it to prove the enhancement, concluding it was not
entitled to "full faith and credit" because it did not comply with I.C. § 9-312 or 28
U.S.C. § 1738. The district court's conclusion was erroneous because the ldaho
Rules of Evidence control the admissibility of evidence and whether the
California Judgment is entitled to full faith and credit for other purposes is
irrelevant to the court's admission of evidence of the judgment to prove a prior
conviction.
B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and application of a statute is a legal question over

which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 ldaho
471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007).
C.

Howard's California Judqment Was Admissible And Should Have Been
Considered Bv The District Court For Purposes Of Determining Whether
The State Proved The DUI Enhancement
The district court specifically found the California Judgment admissible

under the ldaho Rules of Evidence. (Tr., p.247, Ls.3-6.) The court, however,
concluded it could not give the California Judgment "full faith and credit as the

requirements of I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 were not met." (R., Vol. 11,
p.282.) This conclusion was erroneous.
In order to prove the DUI enhancement, the state was only required to
produce certified copies of judgments indicating Howard had previously been
convicted of two DUls within Zen years. I.C. § 18-8005(5); I.R.E. 803(8), 902(4);
see State v. Medrain, 143 ldaho 329, 333,
-

144 P.3d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 2006) ("a

certified copy of a judgment of conviction" along with evidence establishing
identity of person formerly convicted is sufficient to prove persistent violator
enhancement); State v. Smith, 116 ldaho 553, 560, 777 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Ct.
App. 1989) (in order to prove persistent violator enhancement, "the state needed
only to produce copies of judgments specifically identifying the crimes as
felonies, or - if the judgments were not so specific - to offer admissible copies of
the felony statutes applicable to the crimes recited in the judgments"). The state
met its burden by introducing Exhibits 76 and 8, certified copies of Howard's prior
judgments of conviction for DUI from California and Kootenai County, which the
court deemed admissible under the ldaho Rules of Evidence.
The state was not further obligated to comply with I.C. § 9-312, which
provides for authentication of a "judicial record" "of another state . . . by the
attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a clerk and
seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate, that the
attestation is in due form,"3 because a statutory provision that purports to govern

The district court concluded the California Judgment did not comply with I.C. 3
9-312 because it did not include "a certificate of the chief judge or presiding
magistrate." (R., Vol. 11, p.279.)
-

.

.

.
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the admissibility of evidence that is in conflict with the rules of evidence is of no
force or effect. State v. Martinez, 125 ldaho 445, 450, 872 P.2d 708, 713 (1994)
(citing State v. Zimmerman, 121 ldaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992) and
State v. Griffith, 97 ldaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975)).
The district court's reliance on State v. Prince, 64 ldaho 343, 132 P.2d 146
(1942), and State v. Martinez, 102 ldaho 875, 643 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1982), for a
contrary conclusion is misplaced. In Prince,the state charged the defendant with
being a persistent violator based, in part, on a prior conviction from Oregon. 64
ldaho a t , 132 P.2d at 147. On appeal, Prince asserted the evidence was
insufficient to support the persistent violator enhancement because, he argued,
the state failed to prove the Oregon court had jurisdiction to enter judgment
against him.

Id. Operating on the premise that "it was necessary for the state to

establish upon the trial that the Oregon Court had jurisdiction," the court analyzed
the "method of proof of jurisdiction of the Oregon Court."

Id.at -,

132 P.2d at

148. In doing so, the court first referenced the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution and its requirement that "public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other State" be given full, faith and credit in the
manner prescribed by Congress.

Id. The court then cited the manner prescribed

by Congress, as set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. 3 687, which read:
The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State or
Territory, or of any such country, shall be proved or admitted in any
other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk,
and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a
certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that
the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial
proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States as they have

by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are
taken.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
The court further cited I.C.A. § 16-310 (now codified as I.C.

9 9-312), and

concluded that because the judgments offered complied "with the provisions of
the Federal Constitution, the Act of Congress 128 U.S.C. § 6871, and Section 16310," they "were admissible in evidence, and entitled to the same faith and credit
which would have been accorded to them in the State of Oregon," and, as such,
"established as a matter of fact and by a presumption of law," that the Oregon
courts had jurisdiction to enter judgment against Prince.

Prince,64 ldaho at -,

132 P.2d at 148.
The district court concluded Prince "tells us that" "[c]ompliance with both
ldaho Code § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 is mandatory." (R., Vol. 11, p.279.)
This conclusion is incorrect.

Prince merely indicates that compliance with I.C. 3

9-312 and 28 U.S.C.

1738 satisfied the then-existing authentication

requirements for admissibility and proof of jurisdiction, not that compliance with
those provisions is "mandatory." Even if the statutory requirement set forth in I.C.

3 9-312 was considered mandatory when Prince was issued in 1942, that statute
predates I.R.E. 803, adopted in 1985, and is no longer controlling in relation to
the proper method for authentication. Martinez, 125 Idaho at 450, 872 P.2d at
713 (citing Zimmerman, 121 ldaho at 974, 829 P.2d at 864, and Griffith, 97 ldaho
52, 539 P.2d 604).
In Martinez, the relevant issue on appeal was whether the evidence
admitted at trial for purposes of proving a persistent violator enhancement was

admissible. 102 Idaho at 880, 643 P.2d at 560. One of the judgments at issue
was a "certified copy of a 1973 federal judgment of conviction," which the court of
appeals noted "complied with Idaho's requirement for proper authentication of a
judicial record, I.C. s 9-312."~id.(emphasis added). Even if compliance with I.C.
§ 9-312 was "required" when Martinez was issued in 1982, as with

Prince,that

case and the statute upon which it relies predates the applicabie rule of evidence
and, therefore, is no longer controlling,
The district court's conclusion that it could not give "full faith and credit" to
the California Judgment because it did not include the certification required by 28
U.S.C. § 1738 is also erroneous. Section 1738, 28 U.S.C., is the substantial
equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 687, which was referenced in

Prince.

Section 1738

reads:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or
Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be
authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or
Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any
such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be
proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a
judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

Notably, although the court of appeals found the judgment complied with I.C. §
9-312, it did not indicate the judgment was accompanied by a "certificate of the
chief judge or presiding magistrate" - the deficiency found by the district court in
this case with respect to the California Judgment. Rather, the court of appeals
only stated that the judgment "was proved by the attestation of the clerk of the
United States District Court, for the Central District of California" and that the
"seal of that court was annexed to that attestation." Martinez, 102 ldaho at 880,
643 P.2d at 560.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Terriiory or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Section 1738 is not a rule of evidence governing state evidentiary issues
(or federal evidentiary issues for that matter); it merely requires state courts to
give full faith and credit to judgments properly authenticated under its provisions.
As such, it was not relevant to the district court's determination regarding the
admissibility of the California Judgment. Indeed, even a judgment offered in
federal court as proof of a prior conviction is not required to comply with 28
U.S.C. § 1738 as long as it is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
As explained by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062,
1075 (9" Cir. 2005):
Weiland makes a strained argument that $j1738 creates
heightened evidentiary requirements for the admission of the
records of a prior conviction. We can find no authority for this
proposition, nor does reason support it. To the contrary, the
commentary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44, incorporated
into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 27, specifically indicates
that, under circumstances in which 1738 is applicable, proof may
be made either by compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence
or in compliance with § 1738.
Section 1738 is designed to ensure that each state and
federal court provides full faith and credit to appropriately
authenticated judicial judgments rendered in other states. The
contents of the "penitentiary packet" challenged in this case would
be admissible in an Oklahoma criminal court pursuant to the state
hearsay exception for public records, and 1738 provides no bar to
its admission here.
(Footnote and citations omitted, emphasis original.)

Although the district court acknowledged this specific language from
Weiland it nevertheless concluded Weiland is distinguishable because "Weiland
is a federal prosecution, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently allow the interpretation announced in
Weiland," rules the district court found it was "not free to embrace" in the present
case. (R., Vol. II, pp.280-81.) While the district court may not be "free to
embrace" the Federal Rules of Evidence or procedure, this does not render
Weiland irrelevant. The point of Weiland is that compliance with 28 U.S.C.

5

1738 has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence - it simply requires a court
to give full faith and credit to a judgment issued in compliance with that statute. If
the state rules of evidence permit the admission of certain documentary
evidence, "§ 1738 provides no bar to its admission." Weiland, 420 F.3d at 1075.
Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Idaho Rules of Evidence provide for the
admission of the California Judgment, and the district court concluded as much.
The court's inquiry should have ended there; its further consideration of the
matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and I.C. § 9-312 was erroneous. This Court
should, therefore, vacate the district court's order finding Howard "not guilty" of
the enhancement and remand for resentencing.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Part II and Part Ill as to Part II and
remand for resentencing,
DATED this 13th day of April 2009.
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